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ILLINOIS ZONING: ON THE VERGE OF A NEW ERA
Stephen A. Siegel*
Zoning law, originatingin the conservative Lochner era of constitutionaljurisprudence, has long been noted for its conservatism in Illinois and the majority of state courts. ProfessorSiegel
suggests that zoning law should be freed from its Lochner era
bounds by state adoption of modern constitutional standards.
These standardsinclude the expansion of the scope of the police
power and the concomitant limitations on it when individual
liberties are curtailed. The authorargues that Illinois zoning has
begun this transformation,citing and analyzing two 1974 zoning
cases as primary evidence of this change.
Illinois zoning, long noted for its conservatism, has begun a
period of fundamental transformation and modernization. At
present, the primary evidence of this transformation consists of
two recent cases. In one, La Salle National Bank v. City of
Evanston,I the state supreme court changed the law on zoning for
aesthetic purposes. In the other, Forrestview Homeowner's Association v. County of Cook,' a state appellate court took a new
position on the relation between planning and zoning. Two cases,
viewed as isolated departures from existing precedent, might
seem to be slight evidence of major change, especially when the
opinions themselves say nothing to expressly indicate that more
is involved. However, when these cases are analyzed in the context of the history of constitutional jurisprudence as it relates to
the state's police power, a new direction in zoning law emerges.
As the fundamental assumptions of constitutional law change, so
do specific constitutional doctrines which effectuate these assumptions. This has been the history of "equal protection" or
"interstate commerce;" 3 likewise, the "police power," another
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., Columbia University; J.D.,
LL.M., Harvard Law School.
1. 57 Il.2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974). See text accompanying notes 97-130 infra.
2. 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1974). See text accompanying notes 13150 infra.

3. On equal protection compare Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N.E. 395 (1892) and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally
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basic concept of constitutional jurisprudence, has been affected.
The zoning power is a subcategory of the government's police
power.' Not only is zoning sanctioned by the police power, but
every exercise of zoning must be within the limits of that power.'
However, the concept of police power has not been static, and
throughout the twentieth century its applications have steadily
expanded. Hence, zoning, as a dependent concept, has been influenced by important variations in the dimensions of the police
power. It is this process which explains the "new" law found in
the aforementioned cases. These cases are harbingers of things to
come not only for Illinois zoning but for all Illinois land-use controls.' Therefore, prior to the discussion of the characteristics and
development of Illinois' new zoning era, the recent history of constitutional jurisprudence and the police power will be analyzed.
I.

THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE POLICE
POWER UPON ZONING

A.

The Eras of ConstitutionalJurisprudence

Arising in the early twentieth century,7 zoning has existed
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37

reprinted in SELECTED

ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

CALIF.

L.

REV.

341 (1949),

1938-1962, at 789 (AALS ed. 1963).

On interstate commerce compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAv. L. REV. 645 (1946), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

4. See 1 N.

1938-1962, at 218 (AALS ed. 1963).
§§7.01-.05 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW

See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of
Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
5. Cases demonstrating this proposition are numerous. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). For a general discussion of the constitutional
WILLIAMS].

limitations on zoning, see 1 R.
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].

ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§§2.01-.30 (1968)

6. The impact of this transition in Illinois is not limited to zoning. This same trend can
be seen in the area of taxation and expenditure, as evidenced by the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 ll.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d
807 (1972). See notes 49 & 151 infra for a full discussion of this development.
7. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted by New York City in 1916.
For studies of the movement which lead to this measure, see M. Scorr, AMERICAN CITY
PLANNING SINCE 1890, 1-183 (1969); S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969) [hereinafter cited as
TOLL]. The validity of zoning was reviewed by the judiciary in the 1920's. See, e.g., Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84,
149 N.E. 784 (1925).
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throughout two, and perhaps three, eras of constitutional law: the
Lochner, Williamson-Brown and Reed eras.' The Lochner era
bloomed in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
during the 1890's and dominated its jurisprudence until the Depression crisis of the 1930's.1 Concepts marking the period originated in state courts a bit earlier and, in some respects, have
continued to influence their decisions. 0 During the Lochner period the political, economic and social philosophy of laissez-faire
was elevated to constitutional assumption and command." Mr.
Justice Holmes' famous assertion that "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment [did] not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"'"
was then merely a minority position. As between the individual
8. The substance and duration of each era are discussed generally in the text which
immediately follows. With reference to the police power, see text accompanying notes 2149 infra. Each era is styled after leading cases which typify that era's distinctive manner
of constitutional review. The Lochner era is named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), in which the Supreme Court voided maximum working hours legislation as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See notes 34-43 and accompanying text infra. The Williamson-Brown era derives its name from Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), in which legislation prohibiting opticians from duplicating lenses without a prescription was sustained against due process and equal protection
attack, see note 48 and accompanying text infra, and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), in which legislation creating racially separate school systems fell before the
equal protection clause, see note 44 and accompanying text infra. The Reed era is styled
for Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which a statute favoring males as decedent estate
administrators was struck down using a new equal protection analysis. See Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HnAv. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1972).
9. On the origins and demise of the Lochner era, see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST
GOVERNMENT 116-69 (1948) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN]; B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND
CONSTITUTION 110-253 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Twiss].
10. For the origins, see, e.g., In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). See also Twiss, supra note
9, at 18-109. For the demise, see, e.g., State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners,
Inc., 40 Cal.2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953). See also Hetherington, State Economic Regulation
and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1958).
11. Twiss, supra note 9, at 1-9; Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational
Licensing, 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1965); Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909).
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See H.
SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1883). Spencer's massive work maintained that a true system
of morality cannot adopt government as one of its premises. "Government . . . is an
institution originating in man's imperfection . . . 'whereas' [a] system of moral philosophy professes to be a code of correct rules for the control of human beings." Id. at 27.
Accordingly, government could be dispensed with if the world were peopled with the
unselfish and the conscientious. In short, government is only a necessary evil.
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and society, individual "freedom [was] the general rule and restraint the exception.' ' State infringement could be justified
"only by the existence of exceptional circumstances."' 4 Accordingly, much regulatory legislation frequently was not given the
presumption of validity and had to seek specific constitutional
authorization or be struck down as a denial of that vague concept,
'5
"due process." '
The Lochner era was ended abruptly by the United States Supreme Court in 1937 and was succeeded by the WilliamsonBrown era, which stood Lochnerism on its head.'" State power
became the rule; individual freedom became the exception. Accordingly, the Court largely abandoned substantive due process
review and proceded to evolve a "two-tier" test under the equal
protection clause. This approach reviews legislation under two
distinct standards. In one standard, "minimal rationality" is
applied: legislation is upheld if it has any tendency to promote
a permissible governmental purpose. However, certain areas,
carved out for second tier analysis, are subjected to "strict scrutiny," and regulation of these areas is struck down unless a compelling state interest can be shown. While most legislation, including all economic regulation, is reviewed and sanctioned under
the "minimal scrutiny" of the first tier, second tier analysis is
reserved for those laws which infringe upon individual liberties or
affect certain minorities." As a consequence, the Williamson13. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
14. Id.
15. See CORWIN, supra note 9, at 151-53; Twiss, supra note 9, at 28-29.
16. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which overruled Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), by upholding the validity of a state's minimum
wage law, and which signified the beginning of the Williamson-Brown era. After this case
the Supreme Court became merely a "rubber-stamp" for the legislature; substantive due
process review for economic legislation was rarely used again. However, in the early 1950's
non-economic legislation was challenged under the equal protection clause as violative of
certain important rights. See also note 8 supra; Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in
Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of IrresponsibleJudicial Review and the
Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 153 (1975).
17. For a description of the two-tier analysis, see Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection,82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969). See also Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 385 (1975); note 8 supra. One of the most
influential justifications for a "double standard"- strict scrutiny in some situations,
hands-off in others, particularly economic regulation - is Justice Stone's footnote in
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Brown era, in sharp contrast to the Lochner era, represents a
period of pervasive, yet not omnipotent, state power.
Perhaps destroyed by its rigidity, the two-tier analysis of the
Williamson-Brown era may well be over. To provide flexibility for
judicial review, the present Supreme Court appears to be moving
toward a new approach and into a new era, the Reed era." The
Reed era introduces a third tier of review. Under the new tier,
the Court reviews the exercise of governmental powers which affect important interests not covered, either expressly or by implication, by the Bill of Rights. Legislation within this tier must
have some tendency to promote a sufficiently important governmental purpose or goal; otherwise it is void."5 The approach differs from Williamson-Brown in that legislative power is less pervasive in a few more areas, but the Reed era still reflects the
judicial acceptance of the regulatory state. The difference between the two is the more flexible analysis and review of the Reed
era judiciary. Because of the similarity in the underlying philosophy of both eras, it has been suggested that the Reed era not be
viewed as a separate constitutional period. Its principles for analysis merely underlay the two-tier approach and extend the dichotomies of the Williamson-Brown era.25 Thus, for the purpose
United'States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This footnote suggests
that the greatest scrutiny is justified when legislation conflicts with values expressed in
the "specific" prohibitions of the Constitution, or with minority rights and "political
processes." Recent cases have expanded Justice Stone's standard to include "suspect"
classifications, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy is branded a suspect
classification), and "fundamental interests," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(marriage and procreation are declared basic civil rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (the right to travel is raised to a fundamental right under the equal protection
clause).
18. The Reed era is styled for Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See discussion in note
8 supra. See also note 19 infra for Reed era cases.

19. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV.
1 (1972). See also note 8 supra and note 126 infra. For Reed era cases, see, e.g., Stanton
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (in context of child support, Utah statute providing that
period of minority for males extends to age 21 and for females to age 18 denied equal
protection of the laws); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (statute providing state
had right to recover legal defense costs from indigents held to violate equal protection);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that unwed fathers are unfit
guardians violates the equal protection clause).
20. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The Marshall balancing test, also referred to as the sliding scale
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of this Article the Reed era will be viewed as a continuation of
its predecessor, and the focus shall be directed toward a comparison of the police power and zoning in two constitutional eras:
Lochner and Williamson-Brown.
B.

The Police Power

As a principal concept of constitutional doctrine, the police
power is the usual justification of governmental action. Therefore, the shift in basic assumptions between the Lochner and
Williamson-Brown eras was bound to, and did, affect the concept
of the police power. In the Lochner era the police power was
severely limited, while in the Williamson-Brown era it was
greatly extended. Nevertheless, the vast differences between the
two eras' interpretation and application of the police power is
somewhat masked by the fact that the police power's black letter
definition has remained constant: the government may abridge
personal rights of liberty and property when doing so reasonably
promotes the public health, safety, morals, general welfare or
protects other property."
During the Lochner period the scope of police power was not
understood as a grant of general authority. The maxim "use your
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another,"
rather than the maxim "the welfare of the people is the supreme
law," '2 3 underscored the police power and thereby guided its appli-

cation. The common law concept of nuisance, and not the
legislative will, delineated those things which the police power
could proscribe. 4 Consequently, the litany of police power goals
was narrowly construed: health meant protection from disease;
safety meant protection from physical danger; morals meant protection from vice and brutality. The vague savings clause "genapproach, is criticized in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 115-19
(1974).
21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §§7.01-.05. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
84, 92, 1,19
N.E. 784, 788 (1925).
(1954); City of Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill.

22. From the latin sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, BLACK'S
(Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
23. From the latin salus populi suprema lex, id. at 1506.
24. TwIss, supra note 9, at 29-32, 117-18.
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eral welfare" was given little, if any, import." In short, the subject matter over which the police power had jurisdiction was considerably restricted."8 Furthermore, the means used to achieve
police power goals had to be reasonable. If legislation did not
"directly," "really," or "substantially" promote an acceptable
police power goal it was deemed to be unreasonable.27 Vigorously
reviewing to determine if a regulation attained the standard of
reasonableness, the judiciary in some instances would substitute
its own judgment for that of the legislature.2" Limitation of the
police power also was effectuated by constitutional proscription
of partial legislation. As Professor E. Freund noted in 1904,
25. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, Second Part, passim (1904) [hereinafter cited
as FREUND]; Twiss, supra note 9, at 29-32.
26. Government could decree closing times for retailers of liquors but not dry goods.
State v. Ray, 131 N.C. 814, 42 S.E. 960 (1902). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R. 242 (1928).
Government could license barbers but not horseshoers or accountants. See Frazier v.
Shelton, 320 Ill.
253, 150 N.E. 696 (1926); Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing, 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 517-20
(1965). While the sale of railroad tickets was highly regulated, government could not
prevent the "scalping" of theatre tickets. Compare Burdick v. People, 149 IIl. 600, 36 N.E.
340, 83 N.E. 236 (1907). For similar reasons, this
948 (1894), with People v. Steele, 231 Ill.
truncated police power encompassed neither prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in
tenements, In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885), nor compelling government contractors to hire
only union workers, Adams v. Brenan, 177 I1. 194, 52 N.E. 314 (1898).
27. CORWIN, supra note 9, at 143-44, 146-47; FREUND, supra note 25, §63; Twiss, supra
note 9, at 110-40.
28. Accordingly, in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), the United States
Supreme Court struck down minimum wage legislation claiming that even if there was a
connection between minimum wages and the police power goals of health and morals, it
was so incapable of standardization as to render any statute "without reasonable basis."
Id. at 554-57. The New York Court of Appeals, after conceding state power to license
embalmers and undertakers, held it unconstitutional to require embalmers to be qualified
undertakers and vice versa. People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 90 N.E. 451 (1910). The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that despite "very broad" power "to protect society from disease or
epidemic" the legislature could not prohibit the sale of sterilized second hand bedding.
People v. Weiner, 271 I1. 74, 110 N.E. 870 (1915).
29. In the Lochner era, legislative classification and discrimination between classes was
reviewed under the due process clause. To pass "unequal" or "partial" laws was to deny
due process. See, e.g., Bailey v. People, 190 Ill.
28, 60 N.E. 98 (1901); State v. Gravett,
65 Ohio St. 289, 62 N.E. 325 (1901). See also T. M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMrrATIONS 389-97 (1st ed. 1868). It was only with the 1937 demise of substantive due
process that courts began reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection
clause and that the locution "denial of equal protection" was born. See notes 16-17 supra.
In order to fulfill the "equal protection of the laws" doctrine, all persons similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law must be included within the classification.
The term "partial" legislation as used in this Article refers to legislation which is either
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"[partial legislation is] one of the most effectual limitations on
the police power."" Moreover, the view that partial laws violated
due process was given a liberal application. Thus, the practical
use of the police power was restrained, and only "substantial"
distinctions would justify separate classification.3 Consequently,
both the ends and means of the police power were "cabined,
cribbed [and] confined." Perception of these limitations is central to understanding the dialectic of Lochnerian judicial review.33
The limited Lochnerian police power is well illustrated by a
celebrated string of United States Supreme Court cases concerning maximum hours legislation. In Holden v. Hardy34 the Court
upheld legislation limiting miners' hours because it agreed there
were reasonable grounds for believing that this employment,
when long pursued, is detrimental to the health of the employees.35 Eight years later, however, in Lochner v. New York, 36 the
Court struck down a statute limiting bakers' hours, holding that
the regulation did not promote any recognized police power goal.37
Significantly, the tendency of the statute to promote the "general
overinclusive or underinclusive. Overinclusive classifications include a wider range of
individuals than should be included in the class sought to be controlled; underinclusive
classifications do not include all the individuals whom the classification seeks to control.
30. FREUND, supra note 25, §682. The 1904 edition devotes 125 pages to equal protection
problems, nearly all of which cite state court opinions. Thus, Justice Holmes' admonition
in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), that equal protection is the "usual last resort of
constitutional arguments" must be taken with several grains of salt.
31. Twiss, supra note 9, at 28-29. The substantial differences, first mentioned by
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, are of the ilk of infancy and insanity. See T. M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (lst ed. 1868). Thus, in Frorer v. People, 141 11.
171, 31 N.E. 395 (1892), a statute prohibiting "company stores" in mining and manufacturing was voided because it did not also apply to other "branches of industry" such as
construction, transportation, agriculture and domestic service.
32. CORWIN, supra note 9, at 144.
33. This refers to understanding the scheme of judicial analysis, not the social facts
and values of which it was the intellectual superstructure. For the social facts, see CORWIN, supra note 9, passim; A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1893 (1960); Twiss, supra note 9, passim; Friedman, Freedom of
Contract and Occupation Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 487, 525-34 (1965).
34. 169 U.S. 366 (1897).
35. Id. at 395.
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. Other sections of the statute, dealing with washrooms and painting, were of undoubted validity. Id. at 61-62.
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welfare" was dismissed out of hand. 8 The relation of the limitation to the bakers' health, being considered more plausible, was
discussed at length and, indeed, persuaded three justices to vote
to uphold the measure. 0 The majority, however, could not accede
to the legislative judgment that the trade of baker is "an unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize the legislature
to interfere."4'
In spite of Lochner's ringing denunciation of the maximum
hours law, within 12 years the case was overruled without any
departure from the matrix of constitutional assumptions and doctrines to which Lochner has given its name. Again, the key was
the understanding of the scope of police power. Thus, in Bunting
v. Oregon,4' the Court sustained a statute limiting hours of all
employees in manufacturing work. Felix Frankfurter, arguing for
the statute's validity, read Lochner as reflecting the then "common understanding" that length of work did not affect health.
However, subsequent scientific research, he claimed, had shown
this to be untrue; consequently, "judgment by speculation must
yield." 4 Persuaded, the Court accepted the legislature's judgment that regulating hours preserves health, and further, that the
particular regulation was reasonable because it was consistent
with average industrial working hours around the world.43
As constitutional law entered the Williamson-Brown era, the
dimensions of the police power were necessarily revamped. Legislation which intruded upon the interests of racial or political
minorities or the Bill of Rights became subject to rigorous Lochnerian judicial review." Outside of these areas, however, governmental power was supreme.
38. Id. at 57. Safety and morals were also summarily dismissed.
39. Justice Holmes dissented on more general grounds, but eventually tied his approval
into the health justification. Id. at 76.
40. Id. at 59. Without the health justification, this law could not be distinguished from
one regulating the hours of doctors, lawyers, athletes, scientists, or bank clerks. Therefore,
upholding this law would authorize such regulation. This inverted equal protection argument also helped demonstrate the unsoundness and invalidity of this legislation. Id. at
59-61.
41. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
42. Id. at 432.
43. Id. at 438-39.
44. Thus, in Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Supreme Court
invalidated a compulsory flag salute in a public school, writing that:

19761

ILLINOIS ZONING

Several doctrinal changes in the Williamson-Brown era accomplished these results. First, the permissible purposes of the police
power expanded beyond protection from disease, physical harm,
vice and brutality and became a general grant of authority. As
Justice Douglas wrote in Berman v. Parker:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. . . . Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order - these are some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police
power . . . . Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power
and do not delimit it. (emphasis added)45
Second, the traditional standard of reasonableness, defined as a
substantial relation to a permissible purpose, was greatly diminished. Once a legislature determined a reasonable relation existed
between the ends and the means, a court could not intervene
unless that judgment was proven "palpably false."4 Finally, expansion of the police power was accomplished by contraction of
the concept of partial legislation. Equal protection became an
effective limitation on legislative power only within the "protected" Williamson-Brown areas.4" Otherwise, partial legislation,
once allowed only upon "substantial" distinctions, was usually
permitted; the Supreme Court "ha[d] in fact almost abandoned
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include
. . . power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
"rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the State may lawfully protect.
Id. at 639. See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1087-1133 (1969). Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the case for which this constitutional era is partially named, illustrates vigorous judicial review. The Court, faced with legislation impinging on racial minorities, refused to defer to the legislative judgment that separate
facilities could be equal. The Court, citing non-legal sources, independently determined
that "[sleparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 494-95 n.ll.
45. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). (emphasis added)
46. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949).
47. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), discussed in note 8 supra
and other cases discussed in note 17 supra. See also Developments in the Law - Equal
Protection, supra note 17, at 1076-1132 (1969); notes 8, 16, 29 supra.
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the task of reviewing [most] questions of equal protection."48

In both the Lochner and the Williamson-Brown eras, therefore,
the operation of the police power paralleled the breadth of state
power generally." While in the Lochner era state power was
48. Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1087. Thus, in Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), the city had attempted to decrease traffic distractions by prohibiting vehicles from carrying advertisements. The prohibition did not include advertising the vehicle owner's business. When the ordinance was attacked as partial, the Court responded:
The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their
own wares . . . do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or
extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience
which we lack to say that such is not the case.
Id. at 110. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), illustrates the style of
minimal review. In upholding a statute disadvantaging opticians, the Court emphasized
again that for "protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts." Id. at 488.
49. As is true of the police power, other governmental powers also have been affected
by the shifts in constitutional eras. Hence, during the Lochner era the sovereign powers
of eminent domain, taxation and expenditure were accordingly limited. The limitation on
eminent domain was accomplished by a narrow definition of the doctrine of public use.
See, e.g., Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 A. 633 (1913). See
also 2A P. NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §7.2(1) (3d ed. 1975), which defines public use as
the right to be used by the public. This Lochnerian definition represented a major narrowing of the pre-Civil War definition of public use as public benefit or promotion of public
welfare. See Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R.R., 3 Paige 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); Scudder v.
Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 729 (1832).
Taxation and expenditure powers were limited by a narrow definition of public purpose.
The Lochner era judiciary equated taxation's public purpose with eminent domain's narrow definition of public use. For example, in a 1912 Advisory Opinion, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the expenditure of public money to
purchase land to develop low-income housing. Opinion of the Justices to the House of
Representatives, 211 Mass. 624, 629, 98 N.E. 611, 614 (1912). The expenditure was barred
even though the court acknowledged "the measure [was] aimed at mitigating the evils
of overcrowded tenements and unhealthy slums." Id. at 630, 98 N.E. at 614. One of the
most immediate effects of the rise of the Williamson-Brown era was to reverse the judgment that slum control was beyond the scope of the eminent domain, taxation and expenditure powers. See, e.g., Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Auth., 304 Mass.
288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939); New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1
N.E.2d 153 (1936). As slum control became a recognized public use, a variety of governmental activities became acceptable because of their supposed tendency to prevent the
occurrence or reoccurrence of slum conditions: public housing, low income housing, urban
renewal and conservation. See People v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791
(1954) (community conservation accepted as a part of a slum prevention program); People
v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953) (condemnation of obsoletely platted
land accepted as public use because the intended re-use was for housing to help eliminate
or prevent slums elsewhere); Krause v. Peoria Housing Auth., 370 Ill. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193
(1939) (public housing accepted as part of slum clearance program).
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tightly constrained by active judicial review, in the WilliamsonBrown era state power became paramount unless it infringed
upon certain "protected" areas. The following section will discuss
the impact of this variance in the scope of the police power on the
concurrent developments in the law of zoning.
C.

Zoning

The concept of comprehensive governmental regulation of
land-use is now such a common feature of American law that one
might forget that when first proposed 60 years ago it was on the
fringes of legality.'" Prior to the United States Supreme Court's
acceptance of zoning in the landmark 1926 case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"' 14 jurisdictions had adjudicated
its constitutionality, three of them unfavorably. 2 Moreover, the
federal district court which decided the Euclid case unhesitatingly ruled against zoning,5" and there is general belief that the
Supreme Court was at first ready to affirm that decision.54 While
the votes shifted after re-argument, still, three of the nine justices
voted against reversal.
While the Lochner era judiciary, albeit hesitatingly, accepted
zoning, the legislative and executive branches followed this acceptance enthusiastically. 5 By the late 1920's nearly all states
had cities with zoning ordinances. However, Lochner era zoning
had a conservative cast and a limited scope due to the early
proponents of zoning carefully tailoring their device to the requirements of the time. The enumerated statutory purposes of
zoning enabling acts evidence this. The influential Standard
State Zoning EnablingAct,57 drafted in Herbert Hoover's DepartSee ANDERSON, supra note 5, §2.08, at 46-47. See also note 7 supra.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 369-70; ANDERSON, supra note 5, §2.08.
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 397 F. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
TOLL, supra note 7, at 228-53.
Id. at 202. Zoning was even sponsored by the conservative Harding administration.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-1 (1975);' IOWA CODE ANN. §414.3 (1976);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §3 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. §89.040 (1976); N.Y. TOWN LAW
§163 (McKinney 1965). Both the Illinois and the Missouri statutes have added the preservation of historic areas. The Illinois statute goes further by also adding sites, buildings
and areas of architectural and aesthetic importance.
57. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Aer §3 (1926).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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ment of Commerce and still zoning's organic law in 47 states,58
states that the purposes of zoning are:
[T]o lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population;
to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. 9
Aside from the then meaningless "general welfare" clause, each
purpose was undeniably within the core police power goals of
physical safety and health.
Moreover, the judiciary acted to re-enforce zoning's conservative cast, the most frequent technique for limiting the zoning
power being the principle embodied in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge.'"According to this principle, not only a zoning ordinance's general concept, but also its application to a particular
parcel of land, must substantially promote the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." The Nectow view was so
vigorously pursued that "during [the Lochner era] . . . the
courts tended in many or most instances to hold the restrictive
regulations invalid as applied" and the municipality retained the
burden of proof to show why a given restriction should apply to a
particular parcel of land."2
With the rise of the Williamson-Brown era one would expect
widespread changes in zoning law since governmental dominion
over most aspects of life, especially economic affairs, became unassailable in this period. However, this did not occur. The vast
majority of state jurisdictions are still resolving zoning disputes
according to the assumptions of the Lochner era"5 and are sympathetic to the landowner's claim that his private gain takes precedence over the local legislature's assertion of community goals. On
the other hand, the courts of a distinct minority of jurisdictions,
58. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §18.01, at 355.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §3 (1926).
60. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
61. Id. at 188.
62. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §5.03.
63. Id. §§6.02, 6.07-.19. See, e.g., Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453
(1969); Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 435 Pa. 99, 255 A.2d 506 (1969).
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"sympathetic to the idea that communities need some strong
legal powers to restrict private rights in land... ,,,6have liberated zoning from its Lochnerian bounds.
Usually, zoning involves economic regulation which permissibly intrudes upon an individual's possible pecuniary gain. However, zoning occasionally intrudes upon interests beyond the
reach of even the legislature of the Williamson-Brown era. This
occurs, for example, when zoning ordinances are designed to exclude racial minorities 5 or novel family arrangements," or to
infringe on first amendment rights. 7 The state has at least
questionable power over these interests. Nevertheless, zoning has
been allowed to regulate freely beyond the limits imposed upon
the state during the Williamson-Brown era. Thus, the minority
of jurisdictions which have liberated zoning from the Lochner era
are only partially consistent with the assumptions of the
Williamson-Brown era. While this minority has applied the new
era's expanded concept of state police power to zoning, it has not
applied simultaneously the era's expanded concern over individual liberties."8 Even the United States Supreme Court has refused
to discuss, let alone apply, Williamson-Brown era limitations to
the zoning power.69 Further, the Supreme Court has declined to
64. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §6.02, at 115. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962); Vickers v.
Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
65. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), in which
the court struck down a municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of any
new multiple family dwellings as racially discriminatory under Title ViII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.
66. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court upheld a zoning
ordinance prohibiting three or more people unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption from
residing in a single-family district. But see id. at 12-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting); O'Grady
v. Town of New Castle, 43 U.S.L.W. 2345 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
67. See, e.g., American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S.Ct. 214 (1975), in which an ordinance which prohibited the operation of any
"adult" movie theater, bookstore or similar establishment within 1000 feet of any other
such establishment was struck down on the basis of infringement of first amendment
freedoms under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
68. See text accompanying notes 16-17, 43-49 supra.
69. To date the United States Supreme Court has heard only three zoning cases: Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (see note 66 supra).
The Court has accepted three more cases for review: Gribbs v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 214 (1975)(upheld zoning prohibiting
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expand the "protected" areas of the era to include housing or
wealth.7 o
adult bookstores and movie theaters); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,96 S.Ct. 560 (1975) (zoning exclusion
of multiple unit housing for low and moderate income families held unconstitutional);
Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740, cert.
granted, 96 S.Ct. 185 (1975) (zoning ordinance's referendum provision before granting a
rezoning is unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative powers, thereby depriving appellant of due process of law). Not only have they traditionally not wanted to
hear zoning cases, but recent standing to sue decisions imply that the proper forum for
zoning litigation will continue to be in the state courts, even for exclusionary zoning
litigation. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing to challenge
exclusionary zoning denied to the following groups: persons who wished to move in because they did not show interest in particular land; taxpayers because of conjectural injury
because they could not assert claims of third parties; housing council because it could only
assert the interest of its members, none of whom had direct injury; builders association
because it did not show monetary injury or loss of particular project); Construction Indus.
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467
(U.S. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1976). Builders association and landowners do not have standing
to sue on behalf of third parties to challenge a restrictive zoning plan. Id. at 904-05.
However, builders and landowners do have standing on personal claims. Id. at 905. The
Petaluma court noted:
The court in Warth v. Seldin left open the federal court doors for plaintiffs who
have some interest in a particular housing project and who, but for the restrictive zoning ordinance, would be able to reside in the community.
Id. at 905. Perhaps the best exposition of the Supreme Court's reluctance to review zoning
cases is San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In
so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has
traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished
against such interferences . . . . (footnotes omitted)
Id. at 40. Thus, perhaps zoning, similar to tax law, is a purely local matter best left to
state courts and legislatures. However, lower federal courts have continued to actively
review zoning cases. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1975) (race); United Farm Workers Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799 (5th Cir. 1974) (race); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (race).
See also cases cited in note 66 supra.
70. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973)
(public school financing system did not discriminate against a definable class of poor);
Lindsay v. Normit, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (a divided court held that housing was not a fundamental interest); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (mandatory referendums on low
cost housing did not violate equal protection, but rather insured democratic decisionmaking). The Valtierra Court did not deal directly with the issue of wealth as a suspect
classification "which demands exacting judicial scrutiny." But see state court cases, e.g.,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975) (see discussion in text accompanying notes 81-85 infra); Serrano v. Priest, 5
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State courts need not exactly parallel federal developments.
While they must uphold the Supreme Court's pronouncements as
constitutional standards, they may expand these standards beyond the limits imposed by the Supreme Court. Following the
Williamson-Brown era's underlying concern with individual liberties and its method of analysis, the evolution of zoning law in
New Jersey, the only state that has been fully liberated from
Lochnerism," illustrates the direction in which state courts may
go.
In the 1920's, the New Jersey judiciary demonstrated its adherence to Lochnerism by holding zoning unconstitutional." After a
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1972) (discrimination in school financing
based on wealth of the district is invalid).
71. Other state courts appear to be moving in the same direction.
See, e.g., Fasano v.
Board of City Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). See also note 149 and discussion
in text accompanying 149-50 infra. In Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1973), the New York Court of Appeals upheld a phased growth
control scheme which could delay the use of land for up to 18 years. However, the court
also stated that it would not condone such a scheme if there was evidence showing that
its purpose was "exclusion." Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152; id. at
391-92, 285 N.E.2d at 310, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64 (Breitel, J., dissenting). In Associated
Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.Rptr. 630
(1971), the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of subdivision exactionsdedication of land or payment of fees in lieu of land-for parks and recreational purposes.
The court stated, however, that evidence showing that the imposition of such exactions
prevented the influx of economically depressed persons into the community would render
such an ordinance constitutionally deficient. Id. at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal.Rptr. at
642. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), the Pennsylvania court struck
down a zoning ordinance prohibiting apartment buildings as exclusionary. However, only
three judges were fully in the Williamson-Brown era. Bell, J., concurring, expressed the
purely Lochnerian view of "the right to use one's property in any way and manner and
for any purpose the owner desires." Three dissenting opinions partially represented the
Williamson-Brown era in fully accepting the regulatory state, but not recognizing any
constitutional limitations.
Even in Illinois, there has been a hesitant recognitionof Williamson-Brown limitations,
but these limitations have not been applied. See Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will,
114 Ill.App.2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (3d Dist. 1969). "While we do not predicate our
conclusion upon the need for lower cost housing, we believe that this was an element which
should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the restrictive zoning ordinance." Id. at 279, 252 N.E.2d at 770.
72. See Ignaciunas v. Risley, 98 N.J.L. 712, 121 A. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd on limited
grounds sub nom. State v. Nutley, 99 N.J.L. 389, 125 A. 121 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey struck down a municipal zoning ordinance which prohibited
petitioner from constructing a combination store and dwelling as an unconstitutional
deprivation of petitioner's right to the use of his property under both the state and federal
constitutions. On appeal, petitioner's right to construct his building was upheld. However,
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state constitutional amendment specifically authorized zoning,
the courts of this state tightly held it to its Lochnerian bounds.
In Brookdale Homes, Inc. v. Johnson,73 the state supreme court
invalidated a zoning ordinance which prescribed minimum residential building heights. Arguing that. smaller buildings were less
expensive and paid less property tax, and that they reduced
neighboring property values by increasing the total individual tax
bill, the city attempted to enforce the measure because it conserved the value of property in the municipality, one of the accepted purposes of zoning. The court, however, rejected the ordinance because it did not meet the Lochner era standard of rationality; small houses, after all, could cost as much as taller ones.
Furthermore, the court stated that if the city's argument was
sound, "a municipality under the cloak of its zoning power, might
provide that no house costing less than a certain sum should be
erected," 74 a result which would be clearly illegal.
A decade later, however, the New Jersey court cut zoning free
from its Lochner era limitations, specifically overruling
Brookdale Homes, Inc. and accepting a variety of minimum standards, first in the name of public health, and later in the name
of planning." In the widely noted case of Vickers v. Township
Committee of Gloucester Township," a township on the fringe of
the Philadelphia metropolitan area had adopted a zoning ordinance based on a plan excluding mobile homes from an underdeveloped 23 square mile rural area. The New Jersey Supreme
Court sustained the prohibition, holding such regulation valid for
the court thought decision of the constitutional issues unnecessary. The court held that
under the state's enabling act, the power of a municipality to regulate the purposes for
which property may be used was limited to regulations "designed to promote the public
health, safety, and general welfare." The court held that though construction of a store
in a residential neighborhood might be objectionable to other neighboring property owners, this fact was immaterial, "for such property owners have not acquired the right to
impose upon owners of other property in the vicinity any restrictions upon the lawful use
thereof." Therefore, the municipal ordinance, insofar as not authorized by the state enabling act, was void. 99 N.J.L. at 392, 125 A. at 122.
73. 123 N.J.L. 602, 10 A.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 126 N.J.L. 516, 19 A.2d 868 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1941).
74. 123 N.J.L. at 606, 10 A.2d at 478.
75. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952);
Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
76. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
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those "rural areas which will remain undeveloped for the reasonably foreseeable future"" because
Zoning must subserve the long-range needs of the future as well
as the immediate needs of the present and the reasonably foreseeable future. It is, in short, an implementing tool of sound
planning."8
Thus, planning was used to validate a perhaps otherwise invalid
zoning ordinance by an expansion of the general welfare police
power goal, a move beyond the traditionally narrow goals of
health, safety, and protection of property values. In response, a
dissenting opinion castigated the majority for allowing the desirable goal of planning to permit "developing municipalities to erect
exclusionary walls . . .according to local whim or selfish desire
''79

In freeing zoning from its Lochner era bonds, the New Jersey
judiciary failed to explore the applicability of the new limitations
of the Williamson-Brown era. Zoning became a boundless license
for structuring a municipality according to its own desires, as if
the interests which zoning entrenched upon were purely economic. Legal commentators, sensitive to the fact that zoning for
minimum standards encroaches upon the vital interests of racial
and economic minorities, promptly and persistently criticized
these New Jersey developments. 0
It was not until 1975 that the New Jersey Supreme Court finally brought its zoning law into the full swing of the WilliamsonBrown era of constitutional jurisprudence. Imposing new limitations on local zoning power in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel," the court, returning to basic
police power doctrine, noted:
[Zioning regulation, like any police power enactment, must
promote public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare
77. Id. at 244-45, 181 A.2d at 136.
78. Id. at 245, 181 A.2d at 136, citing Napierowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J.
481, 494, 150 A.2d 481, 488 (1959).
79. 37 N.J. at 252, 181 A.2d at 140.
80. For a partial listing of articles, see Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential

Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827, 828 n.2.
81. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
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....
Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to the
general welfare is invalid (emphasis added)."2
Recognizing that shelter is a basic human need 3 and that local
zoning regulations have an impact on regional housing needs, the
court stated that in order for a developing municipality's zoning
to promote the general welfare it must
[P]lan and provide, by its land-use regulations, the reasonable
opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing,
including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may
desire to live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt
regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportunity.8 4
Thus, the New Jersey courts have accepted regional housing
needs as a Williamson-Brown type limitation on the zoning
power. This development is not surprising since regional housing
involves basic needs of lower income groups and racial minorities.
Protecting these groups from legislative oppression is an extension of the fundamental sensitivity of Williamson-Brown constitutional philosophy. In accepting a limitation on the state's police
power which goes beyond those the United States Supreme Court
has been willing to impose," the case stands as the precursor of
further developments in New Jersey and other states.
II

DEVELOPMENTS IN ILLINOIS

In light of the foregoing, Illinois zoning experience can be
quickly surveyed. The Lochner era came early to Illinois, where
the string of due process invalidations began in the 1880's.11 When
82. Id. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725. (emphasis added)
83. Id. at 178, 336 A.2d at 727.
84. Id. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 728.
85. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), discussed in note 70 supra. But see right to vote cases where
the Supreme Court has been willing to invalidate regulations that discriminate indirectly,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 338 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
86. See, e.g., Frazier v. Shelton, 320 I1. 253, 150 N.E. 696 (1926); Ritchie v. People,
155 Il1. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895); Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N.E. 631 (1886). In the
Ritchie case, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated legislation which regulated working
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the Illinois court reviewed and sustained the constitutionality of
zoning in 1925,11 it still was committed to a thorough-going Lochnerism. Consequently, during the 1920's, numerous statutes and
ordinances fell under due process objections that they were not
within the scope of the police power,88 were unreasonable methods
for achieving proper objectives,89 or were denials of the equal protection of the laws.9 Throughout this period the Illinois Supreme
Court was still speaking the language of natural law.' For example, in Elie v. Adams Express Co.,92 an ordinance requiring full
stops and reduced speeds at intersections was struck down as an
"unreasonable" means of achieving traffic safety, the court noting that "ordinances of a regulatory nature in contravention of
the natural rights of individuals . . . must be reasonable." 3
hours for women. Interestingly, when similar legislation was reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court 13 years later, the Court, in spite of its Lochnerian philosophy, was able
to uphold the regulation. Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
87. See City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Il. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
88. See, e.g., Frazier v. Shelton, 320 Ill.
253, 150 N.E. 696 (1926) (licensing of accountants); Village of Westville v. Rainwater, 294 Ill. 409, 128 N.E. 492 (1920) (licensing of
wholesale delivery of soft drinks).
89. See, e.g., Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. 368,
154 N.E. 131 (1926) (requiring structures containing dry cleaning establishments to be 50
feet from neighboring structures was an unreasonable means of fire protection); Elie v.
Adams Express Co., 300 Ill.
340, 133 N.E. 243 (1921) (see text accompanying note 92
infra).
90. See, e.g., Lowenthal v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill.
190, 144 N.E. 829 (1924) (requiring
licensing for drugstores which sell merchandise such as stationery, in addition to merchandise already regulated, such as drugs, medicines and liquors, but not other stores selling
similar goods, denies equal protection); McCray v. City of Chicago, 292 II. 60, 126 N.E.
557 (1920) (requiring wood lath and plaster for certain building specifications discriminates against other equally safe materials).
91. See generally C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 143-234 (1930).
The natural law jurisprudence of the Lochner era was seen as having both constitutional
and extra-constitutional roots:
The right to acquire property, to own it, to deal with it, and to use it, as the
owner chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural right. This does
not owe its origin to Constitutions. It existed before them. (citation omitted) It
is however, a right guaranteed by our Constitutions.
Ignaciunas v. Risley, 98 N.J.L. 712, 715-16, 121 A. 783, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd on
limited grounds sub nom. State v. Nutley, 99 N.J.L. 389, 125 A. 121 (Ct. Err. & App.
1924). Haines' work, however, suggests that the non-constitutional bases would not have
surfaced without the impetus of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
92. 300 Ill. 340, 133 N.E. 243 (1921).
93. Id. at 344, 133 N.E. at 245. See also People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 306 I1.
486, 138 N.E. 155 (1923), in which a statute requiring employers to give employees two
hours off, with pay, on election day fell before the "overrid[ing] demands of natural
justice." Id. at 494, 138 N.E. at 158.
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While the Illinois judiciary accepted the concept of zoning, it
reviewed with hostility a zoning ordinance's application to a specific parcel of land, 4 keeping this area of law within its Lochnerian mold far into the Williamson-Brown era. As late as 1972
Professor Norman Williams was to observe:
Illinois zoning law is unique in the United States, since this is
the only state in which the courts have remained happily stuck
in the [Lochner] period of American zoning . . ..
By-and-large this judgment still appears to be accurate; nevertheless, since 1972 several cases have been decided which have
indicated that Illinois zoning, and perhaps all forms of land-use
control," are emerging from the Lochner era.
A.

Zoning for Aesthetic Purposes:La Salle National Bank v.
City of Evanston

In May 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court changed the law with
respect to zoning for aesthetic purposes in La Salle National
Bank v. City of Evanston.9 Before this decision aesthetic goals
had been irrelevant to a zoning restriction's legal validity.9 8 Although frequently important to the local legislature's adoption or
rejection of a zoning ordinance, aesthetic goals could not be used
to strike down a restriction nor to uphold it. Altering this situation, the Illinois high court explicitly recognized that aesthetic
factors are "a properly cognizable feature" tending to justify a
94. In 1947, one commentator noted:
The Supreme Court of Illinois has not been sympathetic to . . . zoning ...
[Any municipality which defends its zoning ordinance before the Illinois Su-

preme Court must assume the heavy burden of demonstrating that its regulations differ from the great majority of the zoning ordinances which the Court
has scrutinized.
Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 87, 87-89 (1947).
95. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §6.17. While Professor Williams' treatise was published in
1974, his research included developments through 1972. Id. at viii.
96. See note 151 infra.
97. 57 Il.2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974). The property in this case was situated between
the business district of Evanston, a Chicago suburb, and park land which was located on
the lake front. The plaintiff sought to change the zoning ordinance from R-1 (single-family
residence district prohibiting structures in excess of 35 feet in height) to R-7 (generalresidence district allowing structural heights to 85 feet).
98. See Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942), and discussion
in text accompanying notes 105-06 infra.
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zoning ordinance if they are accompanied by other more traditional factors, such as decreased neighboring property values.99
Moreover, the court's opinion openly raises the possibility that
aesthetic goals alone may validate zoning restrictions.'
Prior to 1974, Illinois law was a consequence of the Lochner
era origins of zoning in which aesthetic regulation was considered
outside the realm of the state's police power.10' Illinois had
adopted this position in Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture
Training School,'02 where a statute prohibiting outdoor advertising structures within five hundred feet of any park or boulevard
was invalidated. Here the supreme court determined that the law
had an exclusively aesthetic purpose and was thus "disassociated
entirely from any relation to the [Lochnerian conception of the]
public health, morals, comfort or general welfare."'" 3 As the
Lochner era progressed, however, there was some undermining of
the judicial rejection of aesthetic regulation.' 4 Fewer measures
were viewed as serving only an aesthetic purpose and many aesthetic measures were validated as health or safety ordinances.
The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately followed this trend in
Neef v. City of Springfield,'°5 in which an aesthetic regulation was
allowed because other valid police power goals were present. In
this case landowners objected when the city refused to rezone
their property to allow a gasoline filling station. The property
99. 57 Ill.2d at 432, 312 N.E.2d at 634.

100. Id.
101. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §§11.01.06.
102. 249 Ill.
436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911).
103. Id. at 442, 94 N.E. at 923.
104. See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), aff'g 267
I1. 344, 108 N.E. 340 (1914) (upholding ordinance prohibiting erection of billboards in
residential city blocks unless consent obtained from owners of majority of frontage property); State ex rel. Giangrosso v. City of New Orleans, 159 La. 1016, 106 So. 549 (1925)
(prohibition of business construction within designated residential area upheld because
the prohibition could have been justified on public safety considerations); Turner v. New
Bern, 187 N.C. 541, 122 S.E. 469 (1924) (ordinance excluding lumber yards from residential area upheld as valid exercise of police power); Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70
A. 113 (1908) (it is within police power of city to place height restrictions upon all but
church construction in landmark-laden area upon grounds of fire prevention). See also
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §§11.01-.09.
105. 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942).
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abutted the avenue leading from the state capital to the cemetery
in which Abraham Lincoln is buried and for which substantial
public and private funds had been expended. All the public officials who testified at the court hearing stated that a desire to
preserve the beauty of the avenue was one of their motivations
for refusing to rezone. The supreme court sustained the city's
decision, however, because other reasons existed which the evidence amply supported: the traditionally acceptable goals of
traffic safety and preservation of neighboring property values.
The court stated:
It is no objection . . . to a zoning ordinance that it tends to

promote an aesthetic purpose, if its reasonableness may be sustained on other grounds. The question here then is whether or
not, disregarding the evidence relating to the beauty of the

neighborhood and the streets and other aesthetic purposes, the
ordinance should be sustained on the grounds of public health,
safety, morals or general welfare (emphasis added).""'
While the new law found in La Salle National Bank, that aesthetic factors can help to validate a zoning restriction, is a result
of the demise of the Lochner era in Illinois zoning law, questions
still remain. What delayed the change in the law of aesthetic
zoning? Why is the Illinois Supreme Court still hesitant to accept aesthetics as a sole validating factor? Fueling our interest
is the fact that these questions are not unique to Illinois; they
are typical of problems facing the majority of jurisdictions.
Nationally, no more than eight states allow aesthetics as a
sole validating factor,'"7 in spite of frequent calls from both
scholarly journals'"' and the United States Supreme Court for
106. Id. at 280, 43 N.E.2d at 950. (emphasis added)
107. See, e.g., Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Cromwell v. Ferrier,
19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Berlin, 62 Misc.2d 272,
307 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1975). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1235-41 (1968). Other

states validate zoning ordinances based partially on aesthetic considerations. See, e.g.,
Desert Outdoor Adver. v. County of San Bernardino, 255 Cal.App.2d 765, 63 Cal.Rptr.
543 (1967); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1975). See generally
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1238-47.
108. "The subject of aesthetics has perhaps been written about more than any other
aspect of land-use controls in recent years." D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 93 (1971). For a partial listing see id. at 93 n.44. See also
Crumplar, Architectural Controls: Aesthetic Regulation of the Urban-Environment, 6
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aesthetically-based land-use controls. Over 20 years ago, that
usually influential Court wrote:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."'
Yet, why have a majority of jurisdictions been so hesitant to
accept aesthetic zoning as part of the police power goal of general
welfare?
The conventional answer seems to be that aesthetics is a matter
of taste about which there can be no objective, rational decision."" This implies that a Lochnerian concept of rationality is
still a limit on the police power and that aesthetics, therefore, is
beyond the modern legislature's power. This answer, however, is
insufficient for several reasons. First, many legislative decisions,
such as election district boundary drawing or aiding the aged
more than the blind, or vice versa, are not susceptible to rationality."' Nevertheless, they are permitted, even demanded. Courts
require governmental decisions to be rational only when they can
be. But, if the nature of a decision is such that it must be nonrational, the lack of rationality ought not to invalidate the decision. Therefore, even if aesthetic decisions must be somewhat
subjective, they should be permitted unless distinguishable from
other subjective decisions which are allowed.
Second, the Williamson-Brown standard of rationality is such
a watered down version of its Lochner era predecessor, that aesthetics should be able to meet even the rationality test. Lochner
era judges could doubt that a billboard-less vista improved public
URBAN LAW 622 (1974); Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity,

71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973).
109. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
110. See Note, supra note 108, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973).
111. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1230-49 (1970). Professor Ely writes "In bounding a . . . voting district...
the state must select a subclass from the whole of society and in the process exclude a
number of persons who cannot be said on any rational ground to be unqualified for

inclusion. Certain factors obviously cannot be used as criteria ...
....

Id. at 1233.

race, religion, ancestry
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health, safety and morals"' because the standard of reasonableness required a "direct" and "substantial" connection with the
police power goal. However, Williamson-Brown era judges view
the rationality standard to be whether the legislative judgment
is "palpably false," a hurdle that aesthetics should be capable of
leaping."'
Finally, if lack of rationality is the key, aesthetics should have
remained irrelevant to upholding the validity of an ordinance
throughout both the Lochner and Williamson-Brown eras. Yet,
Illinois and most other jurisdictions now allow aesthetics, if accompanied by other factors, to support the validity of an ordinance. The fact that aesthetic goals are accompanied by more
traditional police power goals does not render the aesthetic factors themselves more rational.
Rather than being a problem of lack of rationality the problem
surrounding aesthetic zoning is the judiciary's conception of it as
a unitary concept. Aesthetic zoning, however, encompasses various classes of regulation. Many of these, such as highway billboard regulation or business district sign control, are examples of
"economic regulation." Others, such as architectural control,
may infringe on first amendment freedom of expression interests."'
In the Lochner era aesthetics was irrelevant in upholding an
ordinance whether the ordinance intruded upon economic or first
amendment interests." 5 Therefore, there was no need to subcate112. Nevertheless, early cases upheld billboard regulations on the grounds of morals.
See, e.g., St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929
(1911), which upheld a ban on billboards on the rationale that immoral acts could be
conducted behind them. Later cases expanded the police power goals to include safety,
health, and general welfare by implication. See, e.g., New York State Thruway Auth. v.
Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961) (upheld
regulations prohibiting signs along the thruway for the purpose of providing maximum
visibility, preventing distraction to drivers and interference with traffic regulation, enhancing scenic beauty and promoting maximum safety and well-being of thruway users);
General Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935)
(held that outdoor advertising could be precluded within certain distances from public
grounds and even in business districts because they reduced traffic obstructions, promoted
traveler safety and avoided offensive sights constituting nuisances).
113. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949).
114. See Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 179 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 320, 100 P. 867, 868 (1909);
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gorize the concept of aesthetics. For example, in Hailer Sign
Works v. Physical Culture Training School,"' a statute prohibiting outdoor advertising near parks and boulevards was invalidaCity of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287,
62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905). See also cases cited in note 101 supra, indicating
that aesthetics was outside the police power, and in note 104 supra, noting cases where
aesthetic regulation was upheld on other valid police power goals.
Using United States Supreme Court "symbolic speech" cases,.a case can be made for
the proposition that aesthetic regulation may sometimes infringe upon freedom of
expression interests, particularly as applicable to the single-family home. As Frank Lloyd
Wright has written, "There should be as many types of houses as there are types of people,
and as many differentiations of the types as there are different people." F. L. WRIGHT,

To
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(1896). However, "[an act cannot be classified as symbolic

speech merely because the agent says that it is an attempt to communicate some message." Hall, Legal Toleration of Civil Disobedience, 81 ETHICS 128, 132 (1971). Thus, in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
conviction for knowingly burning his draft card in spite of O'Brien's allegations that his
action was expression and thus protected by the first amendment. But see Tinker v. Des
Moines Ind. Com. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which the Court struck down a
school board prohibition of the wearing of armbands in protest against the Vietnam War
because the conduct was considered "symbolic speech." The Court in O'Brien said that
even if speech is present the conduct may be regulated as long as it meets a four-pronged
test: one, the regulation must be authorized by the Constitution; two, the regulation must
be in furtherance of an important or substantial governmental interest; three, the interest
of the government asserted in the second step must not be directed to the suppression of
free expression; four, a regulation in furtherance of that governmental interest must not
infringe upon first amendment rights more than is necessary.
The first two steps are met by aesthetic regulation. Courts have traditionally held that
zoning laws are a valid exercise of the state's police power, and some courts have recognized that aesthetic regulation is a valid police power goal. However, aesthetic regulation
infringes on more than "conduct;" indeed, it may be termed "symbolic speech." See
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which the Supreme Court, likening the spiritual
with the aesthetic and the physical with the monetary, impliedly recognized that the
lifebreath of architecture is its expressive element. See also Reid v. Architectural Bd. of
Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963), in which the denial of a permit to build
a flat-roofed, single-story residence in a supposedly multi-story community was upheld.
Judge Corrigan, dissenting, stated:
If [plaintiff] wishes to . . . enjoy her trees and garden and other beauties of
nature and whatever decoration she introduces within her walls and her home,
these should be permitted to her. She feels the plan submitted calls for a residence of beauty and utility and so does her architect.
It should be borne in mind that there is an important principle of Eclecticism
in architecture which implies freedom on the part of the architect or client or
both to choose among the styles of the past and present that which seems to
them most appropriate.
Id. at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 80-81. (emphasis added)
116. 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911) (excluding aesthetics from police power control).
See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
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ted by the Illinois Supreme Court primarily because such legislation was disassociated entirely from any relation to the era's narrowly construed police power goals, including the undefined "general welfare.""' 7 Nevertheless, the court went on to mention in
dictum that freedom of expression is an additional ground for
prohibiting aesthetically based controls:
The citizen has always been supposed to be free to determine
the style of architecture of his house, . . . the style and quality
of clothes that he and his family will wear, and it has never been
thought that the legislature could invade private rights so far as
to prescribe the course to be pursued in these and other like
matters . . .,,
The Williamson-Brown era's expanded concept of general welfare permits the acceptance of aesthetic regulation. As such regulation is allowed, therefore, subcategorization of the concept is
necessary to prevent encroachment on the individual liberties
which the era seeks to protect. Aesthetic regulation should be
questioned if it infringes on first amendment interests or other
individual liberties over which the legislature has little power. On
the other hand, regulation of "economic" subcategories of aesthetics clearly would be part of the Williamson-Brown police
power because far less than protection from disease or physical
harm would be required to justify governmental interference with
the profit potential of an individual's property.
Yet, while broadening the interpretation of the concept of "general welfare" to allow aesthetics as a sole or partial validating
factor," 9 the courts have failed to impose corresponding limitations and have continued to treat aesthetic zoning as a unitary
concept. Consequently, aesthetic regulation has been upheld
even when it infringes on freedom of expression-type interests.
For example, State of Missouri ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley' 0
upheld legislation controlling the design of detached singlefamily dwellings, and People v. Stover'2 ' sanctioned a zoning ordi117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 442, 94 N.E. at 923.
Id. at 443, 94 N.E. at 923.
See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
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nance prohibiting clothes lines even though the clothes lines had
been set up as a symbolic protest against increasing taxes.'22
Whether these decisions are disquieting is a matter of opinion
over which first amendment jurists may differ. What is disturbing, however, is the courts' reluctance to recognize that first
amendment issues were involved. 2 ' Therefore, with aesthetic
zoning, as with exclusionary zoning,' the courts have failed to
realize that the new constitutional era necessitates a redefinition
of limits as well as powers.
Because the concept "aesthetic zoning" is not a useful category, cases which fall within the category of "aesthetic regulation" should be broken into their component parts: those regulations which harm the regulatee's economic interests and those
which harm his first amendment interests. Certainly new
"aesthetic categories," in addition to first amendment and economic interests, will continue to arise as the common law process
of case-by-case decision-making proceeds.'25 If the aesthetic cases
are adjudicated with an awareness of the constitutional limitations of the Williamson-Brown era, the resulting debate will at
times be difficult, but it will not be confused or strangely disquieting.'2 6
122. See generally Note, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 81 (1964).

123. Although a first amendment issue was raised in People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462,
191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), the New York Court of Appeals pointed out that
first amendment rights are not absolute but are subject to reasonable regulation, such as
the ordinance at issue. The ordinance was upheld since it was designed to prohibit conduct offensive to the sensibilities and detrimental to property values, and it bore "no
necessary relationship" to the dissemination of ideas or opinions. Id. at 469-70, 191
N.E.2d at 276-77, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40. However, in State of Missouri ex rel. Stoyanoff
v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970), the court did not raise the first amendment issue
and upheld an architectural design ordinance on grounds that aesthetic regulation was a
matter of the general welfare. Id. at 310.
124. See discussion in text accompanying notes 72-85 supra.
125. Other subcategories could be preservation of historic and architectural areas, sites
and buildings, preservation of natural scenic beauty, preservation of urban city vistas, and
maintaining a particular ethnic, rural or "small town" character of a community.
126. Furthermore, as the Reed era progresses courts will have to analyze aesthetic
zoning cases beyond determining whether that landowner's interest is economic or first
amendment and is to receive minimal or strict protection. In the Reed era, the goals of
the intrusion are considered as well as the invaded interest. The degree of judicial protection is determined by an amalgam of the invaded interest and the state's purpose for
intruding. A comparison of the goals involved in regulating the design of a single-family
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La Salle NationalBank is an example of the inherent problems
of treating aesthetics as a unitary concept. The case presents a
conflict between the height of a high rise and the attempt to
create a "gradual tapering of building heights toward an open
lakefront and park area."'' 7 The Illinois Supreme Court could
have created a new category for aesthetic regulation, a category
of fostering public recreational amenities. However, the court
failed to do so. Moreover, the court failed to examine whether the
particularaesthetic goal of the ordinance was a sufficient, complementary or irrelevant factor in justifying the regulation. Instead, the court limited itself to stating that aesthetic factors in
general are a "properly cognizable feature"'' 8 with respect to the
validity of zoning classification.
The incorporation of aesthetics into the "general welfare"
clause of the police power definition is only a faltering and confused first step for the Illinois judiciary. Still unresolved are the
limitations that Illinois courts will place upon regulations which
affect interests that the Williamson-Brown era has sought to protect. By viewing aesthetics as a unitary concept, the court has
incorporated all its subcategories into the "general welfare"
clause. However, probably aware that some aesthetic regulations
infringe upon individual liberties,' 9 the court has held that aesthetics may be used as a validating factor only when complemented by other police power goals. By looking back to its dicta
in Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture TrainingSchool, 3 ° the
Illinois Supreme Court would rediscover that freedom of expression should be protected from "aesthetic regulation." Furtherhome, a first amendment-type interest, will illustrate the Reed approach. Perhaps a
home ought to be immune from design control when the goal is suburban homogeneity
and neighboring property values. But the question of single-family dwelling design control could well receive a different answer if the home is within a historic district, such as
Chicago's "Gold Coast," or is itself a masterpiece such as a Frank Lloyd Wright prairie
house. The goal of starting a tradition by imposing controls may not outweigh the interest
of expression found in one's home. However, the goal of protecting an established and
recognized part of the national heritage could well be of greater importance. See discussion
accompanying note 8 and cases cited in note 19 supra.
127. 57 I1.2d at 432, 312 N.E.2d at 634. (emphasis added)
128. Id.
129. See Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Il1. 436, 442, 94
N.E. 920, 923 (1911).
130. Id. See also quote at text accompanying note 118 supra.
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more, if the subcategories of aesthetics were recognized, the court
might be able to transform its hesitant "partial validation" of
aesthetics, expressed in La Salle National Bank, into the validation of particular aesthetic goals that do not infringe on the individual liberties which modern constitutional jurisprudence seeks
to protect.
B.

Zoning and Planning:Forrestview Homeowner's Association
v.County of Cook

Aesthetic regulation is not the only area of zoning that has
experienced recent change. In March, 1974, the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District adopted a new perspective on the
relationship of planning and zoning. While professional planners
differ as to the form and scope of a land-use plan, there is general
agreement that planning must be based on study, analysis and
projection of the local economy, employment and population.'3 '
Prior to 1974, study, and by definition planning itself was irrelevant to the legal validity of zoning in Illinois. Communities did
not have to plan before they regulated. However, in Forrestview
Homeowner's Association v. County of Cook,'32 an Illinois court
declared, for the first time, that a zoning ordinance's normally
strong presumption of validity was "weakened" by the failure of
the unit of local government "to plan comprehensively for the use
.* of land . . . and. . . to relate its rezoning decisions to data
files and plans or other related . . . agencies.""'3 Thus, a zoning
ordinance's presumption of validity now is affected by planning.
Again, the change is hesitant; in the absence of a plan the presumption of validity is not destroyed, but only weakened.'3
The irrelevance of planning to zoning was a result of the
Lochner era's limited goals for zoning. In an era when profit making was a highly regarded constitutional right and state power
131. See generally F. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING (2d ed. 1972).
132. 18 IlI.App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1974). In this case, plaintiffs sought a
declaration that a Cook County ordinance which rezoned a 96-acre parcel of land from
single-family to general-residence and a special use granted to permit the construction of
a multi-family housing development were void.
133. Id. at 243, 309 N.E.2d at 773.
134. This change is not an isolated Illinois phenomenon. The Illinois court relies upon
and closely follows Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970).
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was tightly contained, zoning's main function, indeed, the reason
for its social and legal acceptance, was to protect established
property values.' 35 The zoning enabling acts of many states reflect
this orientation.' 36 Some states, following the Department of
Commerce's StandardState Zoning EnablingAct, have required
' 37
that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan.'
However, courts in these states never demanded that zoning be
accomplished in two distinct steps: the adoption of a professional
comprehensive plan and the promulgation of the zoning regulations.'38 Rather, judicial interpretation of the clause reduced it to
"meaning nothing more than zoning ordinances. . . be. . . uniform and broad in coverage."' 39 Consequently, the absence of a
professional plan did not invalidate a zoning ordinance. " Lochnerian zoning was to be in accordance with existing property
values, not with a plan. Most segments of society wanted it that
way and, in view of the era's narrowly defined police power goals,
the judiciary probably believed that due process prevented "planning" from limiting private property rights.''
As zoning emerges from the Lochner era, constitutional jurisprudence no longer dictates that planning be irrelevant to zoning.
One should expect, therefore, that, in addition to aesthetic factors, planning will now be admitted as evidence to legitimate an
otherwise questionable zoning ordinance. Thus, a zoning ordinance which does not promote the traditional Lochnerian police
power goals of preservation of property values, or a strict defini135. TOLL, supra note 7, at 196, 203, 206-07.
136. The Illinois Act, drafted in the early 1920's, is a typical example:
In all ordinances . . . due allowance shall be made for existing conditions, the
conservation of property values, the direction of building development to the
best advantage of the entire [unit of local government] and the uses to which
property is devoted ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-1 (1975).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §3 (1926). The
Standard Zoning Enabling Act was adopted at one point in all 50 states. While most states
have retained it, three states have adopted different statutes: Kentucky, Vermont and
Pennsylvania. Washington has adopted an optional municipal code while retaining the
Standard Act. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §18.01.
138. ANDERSON, supra note 5, §5.02, at 234.
139. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1157
(1955); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §2 (1926).
140. ANDERSON, supra note 5, §5.02, at 236.
141. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
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tion of public health and safety, may still be validated if supported by planning.' Conversely, in those states that statutorily
require zoning to be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan,"
one would expect that the zoning ordinance would now be invalid
in the absence of a plan. However, courts are not so holding.
Instead, they may hold, as did the Michigan Supreme Court, that
lack of planning diminishes the validity of a zoning ordinance.14
In Forrestview the court held, by implication, that planning
may now be admitted as part of the police power goal of "general
welfare." This demonstrates that the Illinois judiciary finally
may be recognizing, as the planning profession has always
claimed, that zoning is only one of many tools of planning.' For
The city plan and the zone plan are not two separate things. One
is the whole and the other is a part. The zone plan is that part
of the city plan which relates to developments on private property. . . .The relationship of the two is so obvious and integral,
that there can be but one answer to the question of whether a
good zone plan can be made without making it part of a more
comprehensive plan. There surely cannot."'
While the Illinois Appellate Court did not proceed to invalidate
the zoning ordinance in the absence of a plan, it held that the
absence of planning weakens the ordinance's presumption of validity. The reluctance to invalidate the ordinance may be explained by the fact that most Illinois municipalities have not
planned, and are not able to afford adequate planning in the
immediate future.'46 To invalidate all zoning ordinances on the
142. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962). See also
text accompanying notes 76-79; Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 359,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972); note 71 supra.
143. See Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970).
144. See, e.g., 18 Ill.App.3d 230, 240-43, 309 N.E.2d 763, 771-73. Illinois does not require
zoning to be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 §11-13-1
(1975).
145. TOLL, supra note 7, at 203.
146. There are 1,267 municipalities (cities, towns and villages) and 102 counties in
Illinois. DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS

(1972). Approximately 400 municipalities and 62 counties have prepared plans.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

ILLINOIS

SUMMARY OF LOCAL PLANNING DOCUMENTS IN ILLINOIS

(1973). Most of these plans are relatively old (pre-1965) and were prepared with the use
of federal "701" funds (§701 of the Housing Act of 1954, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §461
(Supp. 1974)). Most likely, municipalities and counties would require federal funds to
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grounds of lack of planning would wreak havoc for Illinois municipalities.
Yet, weakening the presumption of validity itself accomplishes
an important limitation on the zoning power. The more rigorous
judicial hearing which follows from lessening the presumption of
validity acts as a check on legislative favoritism which benefits
one property owner to the detriment of the general public. In the
Lochner era one technique for restraining favoritism was the interpretation of "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as a
requirement that zoning ordinances treat land uniformly and
have broad coverage.'47 Now that courts are defining "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as a planning requirement, the
professional plan, as a statement of goals and policies intrinsic to
a zoning ordinance, can serve as a Williamson-Brown era check
on legislative favoritism. Hence, in this era, a zoning ordinance
which implements a professional plan is accorded a full presumption of validity. On the other hand, in the absence of such a plan,
the weakened presumption of validity permits the judicial hearing to act as a substitute check on favoritism. Perhaps in the
future a professional plan will be compulsory.'4 8
When Forrestview is viewed as a post-Lochner means of checking arbitrariness, the case merges with another recent change in
zoning law which has not yet surfaced fully in Illinois. In Fasano
v. Board of City Commissioners of Washington City, 4 ' the Oregon
initially prepare and to update their comprehensive plans. Yet, the priority for 701 funding
of such "local" plans, as opposed to regional, state or cooperative local plans, has been
decreasing over the past few years. See DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STATE
APPLICATION FOR 701 FUNDS (1972-76). See also McBride & Babcock, The "Master Plan" A Statutory Prerequisiteto a Zoning Ordinance, 12 ZONING DIG. 353 (1960), where it is
argued that statutes requiring a master plan encourage hasty planning and deny the
advantages of zoning to communities which cannot afford a full dress master plan.
147. See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
148. California, one of the most progressive land-use states, has adopted a statutory
planning requirement. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§65100-1 (West 1966), as amended CAL. GOV'T
CODE §65100 (West Supp. 1975).
149. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Interestingly, the Oregon Supreme Court cited
the concurring opinion in Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 Ill.2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962)
in reaching its decision:
It is not part of the legislative function to grant permits, make special exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in character. To place them in the hands of
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Supreme Court ruled that local legislative rezoning of discrete
parcels will be reviewed as quasi-judicial acts. Review of a zoning
decision as a judicial rather than a legislative act means that it
has a weaker presumption of validity. Indeed, the Oregon court
places the burden of proving the validity of the zoning change on
the governing body. Interestingly, the new standard of review is
directly connected with the interest of basing zoning on comprehensive planning. Showing that the zoning change effectuates a
comprehensive plan is one way, noted by the court, that the local
legislature can meet the burden of proof that its decision was not
arbitrary.' 50 Thus, as zoning emerges from the Lochner era, new
techniques to control arbitrariness will arise. One already has
surfaced in Illinois, and it is a precursor of things to come. 5 '
legislative bodies, whose acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open
the door to arbitrary government.
Id. at 424, 186 N.E.2d at 533 (Klingbiel, J., specially concurring), cited at 264 Ore. at 580,
507 P.2d at 26.
150. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. See also Padrow, Sharpe & Sullivan, The Renaissance of Comprehensive Planning: The Oregon Case, 27 LAND-UsE L. & ZONING Di. No.
5, at 7 (1975).
151. A collateral development is evidenced by the recent decision in People ex. rel. City
of Salem v. McMackin, 53 I1l.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972), sustaining the validity of
industrial revenue bonding. Industrial revenue bonding is a technique whereby local government units sell bonds and use the proceeds to create or improve industrial sites for lease
and eventual sale to private industry. The income and proceeds are used to pay the
interest to retire the bonds. Because the municipal funds derived from the bonds are used
to undertake projects leased and sold to private parties, the scheme was attacked for
violating the Illinois Constitution, which provides that "[plublic funds, property or
credit shall be used only for public purposes." Ill. Const. art. 8. §1(a).
In the Lochner era, industrial revenue bonding would not have been a public purpose.
The judicially wrought constitutional command was limited government and free enterprise, and therefore, public purpose was defined as "use by the public." See note 49 supra.
As Illinois courts started to emerge from the Lochner era into the Williamson-Brown era,
they expanded the goals of public use and public purpose to include what more correctly
could be termed public benefits such as the goals of "slum control" and the indirectly
related activities of public housing, urban renewal, low and moderate income housing and
conservation. See Illinois cases cited in note 49 supra. Slum control had at least one foot
in the Lochner era because of its indirect connection with the police power goal of public
health. McMackin is the first Illinois case to snap this chain. In explaining why industrial
revenue bonding is a valid state activity, the supreme court did not speak of slums but of
the expanding concept of "public purpose" in the area of economic welfare. In language
reminiscent of pre-Civil War concepts, see note 49 supra, the court wrote:
Legislation intended to alleviate these conditions [unemployment] and their
inherent problems certainly is in the public interest . . . . The potential impetus to economic development within our State, which otherwise might be lost
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CONCLUSION

Having arisen in the early twentieth century, zoning was imprinted with the Lochner era's constitutional principles and doctrines. Although Lochnerism has perished, it has continued, especially in Illinois, to rule zoning "from the grave."' 5 2 Recently,
however, the Illinois judiciary has hesitantly begun to align zoning with current constitutional philosophy. 5 3 As a result, government will have more power over land-use. Undoubtedly, legislative and administrative bodies, local and statewide, will explore
these enlarged powers. They will select and fashion new techniques for land control which will constitute an exciting and exacting endeavor.
However, the new era also brings with it new concepts of the
limits of governmental power. Thus, there is the equally exciting
and exacting task of exploring, defining and applying modern
constitutional limitations in the land use context as well as fashioning new ones. Though this task can be accomplished at least
partially by legislatures, it is the courts who bear the ultimate
responsibility. To date all branches of government largely have
to other States with financing of this type, likewise serves the public interest.
The private benefit resulting from the Act is incidental to the public purpose
and benefit to be served . . . .(emphasis added)
53 Ill.
2d at 358, 291 N.E. 2d at 814.

152. Obsolete law often has a tendency to do so. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, THE FORmS OF
(A. Clayton & S.W. Whittaker ed. 1968), whose famous aphorism

ACTION AT COMMON LAW

on the subject has been transposed here.
153. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed this hesitancy in Board of
Educ. of School Dist. No. 68 v. Surety Dev. Inc., Ill.2d 347 N.E.2d 149 (1976), involving subdivision control law. Currently, Illinois has a Lochnerian view of the extent
to which the police power authorizes uncompensated mandatory dedication of property
to the public as a condition for permission to subdivide. Subdivision exactions must be
"specifically and uniquely attributable" to the activity of the subdivision and not related
to "the total development of the community." See Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village
of Mt. Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). In Surety, the school board requested
the Illinois court to re-examine and enlarge its test in light of recent more liberal decisions
in other jurisdictions. See Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.Rptr.630 (1971); Billings Property, Inc.
v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1969); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y. 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). The Illinois court refused to
undertake the re-examination, pointing out that the exactions involved in the instant case
were permissible under the current "narrow" test.
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failed to face this responsibility. In this respect, the New Jersey
courts have already begun to apply modern constitutional
limitations. Perhaps the Illinois courts will follow.

